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THE POST-CONVICTION CLAIM THAT
UNITES DEATH ROW
Emily Levy*
INTRODUCTION
“. . . [D]eath-penalty cases are different from other criminal
cases, due to the obvious finality of the punishment.”1
Thirty-one executions have taken place in Arkansas since
1990.2 In February of 2017, Arkansas, uniquely, sought to
execute eight inmates in eleven days—the so-called “Arkansas
Eight.”3 All of those death row inmates shared a common postconviction claim: Strickland. Prior to Strickland v. Washington,
no Supreme Court jurisprudence made clear what constituted
objectively sufficient defense representation pursuant to the Sixth
Amendment. But that changed in 1984 when Strickland made
clear that the Sixth Amendment included the right of effective
assistance of counsel.4
Consider, for example, Ledell Lee, a member of the
Arkansas Eight, who was executed in April of 2017.5 His story
presents an unremarkable set of attorney errors that ultimately
*
J.D. Candidate, The University of Arkansas School of Law, 2021. Executive Editor of
the Arkansas Law Review, 2020-2021. The author thanks Dean Brian Gallini, Willamette
University College of Law, for his constant support and mentorship since the very beginning
of law school. The author also thanks the entire Arkansas Law Review for their countless
hours editing, cite checking, and reviewing. The author would like to thank her family,
Andrea, Paul, and Ilyse, for their unwavering support throughout law school, who never
hesitated to lend an ear or assist in any way possible. Lastly, but not least, the author would
like to thank Kyle for his constant unconditional love and support.
1. Ward v. State, 347 Ark. 515, 517, 65 S.W.3d 451, 453 (2002) (emphasis added).
2. ARKANSAS
DEPARTMENT
OF
CORRECTIONS,
EXECUTIONS
(2020),
[https://perma.cc/4X83-VRT6].
3. The “Arkansas Eight” Update: Three Stays Remain in Place, One Granted
Clemency, AM. BAR ASS’N (Dec. 1, 2017), [https://perma.cc/GDX9-A26T] [hereinafter
Arkansas Eight].
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
5. Ed Pilkington & Jacob Rosenberg, Arkansas Executions: First Prisoner Killed After
Legal Challenge Fails, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2017), [https://perma.cc/K5G3-MCRV].
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should have resulted in the court finding that there was ineffective
assistance of counsel.6 His case was so glaring that his sister,
Deborah Young, continued to declare Lee’s innocence after his
execution.7 Young filed a complaint on January 23, 2020,
“seeking an order of this Court directing the release of physical
evidence in Defendants’ custody for DNA testing and fingerprint
analysis.”8 With the help of the American Civil Liberties Union
and The Innocence Project, Lee’s family hopes to exonerate Lee’s
legacy.9
The Strickland Court decided on a two-prong standard to test
whether a criminal defendant receives constitutionally ineffective
representation.10 First, whether counsel’s performance was
“deficient,” and second, whether the attorney’s performance
“prejudiced” the defendant.11 “Deficient,” said the Court, means
that an attorney’s “representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness.”12 According to the Court, reasonableness is
evaluated objectively in the context of professional norms,
although a reviewing court should “indulge a strong presumption”
that the attorney acted within the “wide range” of permissible trial
strategy.13 Collectively, the Court clarified, the standard was
designed to promote a just outcome for criminal defendants.14
The second prong of the standard requires the defendant to
prove that the deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of
his case.15 That is, the standard requires that “but for” the
insufficient performance, the outcome would have been
different.16 The Supreme Court reasoned that “[a]n error by
counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant
6. See infra Part I.D “Ledell Lee.”
7. Complaint at 1, Young v. Jacksonville Police Dept., et al., No. 60CV-20-639
(Pulaski Cnty., Ark. Jan. 23, 2020); Dakin Andone, Ledell Lee Was Executed in Arkansas in
2017. A New Lawsuit Says He Was Innocent, CNN (last updated Jan. 24, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/K3WZ-QEKY].
8. Complaint, supra note 7, at 1; Andone, supra note 7.
9. Andone, supra note 7.
10. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 688.
13. Id. at 689.
14. See id.
15. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
16. Id. at 694.
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setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error
had no effect on the judgement.”17 The Court reasoned that an
attorney’s mistake is just as likely to be prejudicial as it is to be
benign.18 The second prong, therefore, prevents a defendant from
succeeding on this claim, making the standard unattainable.
This Article argues that Arkansas should adopt a higher
constitutional standard for what constitutes “effective” counsel
for death penalty cases pursuant to Arkansas’ Sixth
Amendment.19 In that narrow context, it should eliminate one
part of the standard articulated by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Strickland v. Washington. Part I tells the story
of each member of the “Arkansas Eight.” Part II, first, explores
the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington.20 Part II then
demonstrates that—quite remarkably—all inmates currently on
the Arkansas death row share a common claim: constitutionally
deficient counsel. Part III contends that Arkansas should expect
more from defense lawyers in death penalty cases. The stories of
the representation provided to the death row defendants demand
a change to the Strickland standard. Dropping the prejudice
prong for death cases is an effective and proactive way to extend
the right that is seemingly inherent to each and every person:
adequate representation.

17. Id. at 691.
18. Id. at 693.
19. The life of a criminal trial takes the following path: investigation, arrest, booking,
post-arrest investigation, charging decision, complaint filed, judicial review, first
appearance, preliminary hearing, arraignment, motions, discovery, plea negotiations, trial,
sentencing, appeals, and collateral remedies. BRIAN R. GALLINI, INVESTIGATIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: INSIDE THIS CENTURY’S MOST (IN)FAMOUS CASES 2-13 (2019). But after
sentencing, a criminal defendant has the ability to challenge the decision, known as a PostConviction Proceeding and Relief. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1. The challenge must be on one of
the following grounds: (1) “that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution
and laws of the United States or this state; or” (2) “that the court imposing the sentence was
without jurisdiction to do so; or” (3) “that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
sentence authorized by law; or” (4) “that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral
attack[.]” Id. Post-Conviction claims are in large part the main place this article lives.
20. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); See infra Part IIA.
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I.
“Carrying out four executions over the course of a week, as
Arkansas did, stands alone in the modern history of capital
punishment in this country.”21
Strickland has, to say the least, played a prominent role in
some of the highest-profile capital litigation in the state of
Arkansas. Consider: in 2017, there was a rush order on
executions when the Governor of Arkansas, Asa Hutchinson,
ordered that eight inmates be put to death during an eleven-day
span.22 “The Arkansas Eight,” as they became known, included
Bruce Ward, Don Davis, Stacey Johnson, Ledell Lee, Marcel
Williams, Jack Jones, Jason McGehee, and Kenneth Williams.23
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court stayed the executions of
Bruce Ward, Don Davis, and Stacey Johnson, and Governor
Hutchinson granted clemency to Jason McGehee, four inmates
were executed within seven days from April 20 through April 27,
2017.24 This condensed period of time caused a flurry of
litigation that ultimately produced four stayed executions.25 A
common claim united the filings: Strickland. Part I discusses the
part Strickland played in the rush order of executions in 2017
through profiles of each inmate.
A. Bruce E. Ward
Nearly twenty-eight years earlier, in 1989, Bruce Ward
killed Rebecca Doss at a Little Rock, Arkansas, gas station.26 The
Pulaski County jury convicted Ward and sentenced him to the
death penalty.27 During Ward’s trial, the circuit judge refused the
defense’s side-bar objections, while allowing the prosecution’s.28
After his conviction and sentencing, Ward appealed to the
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Arkansas Eight, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ward v. Norris, 577 F.3d 925, 928 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id.; Ward v. State, 308 Ark. 415, 418, 827 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1992).
Norris, 577 F.3d at 928.
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Arkansas Supreme Court.29 Although the court affirmed Ward’s
conviction, it remanded for re-sentencing.30 The jury, again,
sentenced Ward to death.31 But because the court reporter for
Ward’s proceeding did not accurately record the proceedings or
include the number of bench conferences, a third sentencing
followed.32 Yet again, the jury sentenced Ward to death, and this
time, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.33
Ward sought post-conviction relief by arguing that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to “challenge[] the judge’s
actions or move[] for the judge to recuse on the ground of bias”
during trial.34 During the post-conviction hearing, the court held
that the circuit court judge’s denial of side-bar objections only to
the defense “did not reflect actual or presumed bias rising to the
level of a constitutional violation or a structural error.”35 The
court reasoned that “unfavorable” lower court rulings do not
constitute a Strickland claim.36 Ward, however, did not assert that
the court’s judgment formed the basis for his Strickland claim.37
Rather, he focused on his attorney’s failure to object to the judge’s
actions.38 The reviewing court, nevertheless, denied postconviction relief.39
B. Don Davis
Don Davis’s story began in 1990, a year after Ward killed
Doss. When Richard Daniel returned home on October 12, 1990,
he found his wife, Jane Daniel, lying in blood.40 A Benton County
jury convicted Davis of Daniel’s murder, as well as burglary and
theft.41 After his conviction and death sentence, Davis argued that
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ward v. Norris, 577 F.3d 925, 929 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 936.
Id. at 937.
Id. at 937-38.
See id. at 936.
See Ward v. Norris, 577 F.3d 925, 937 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 938.
Davis v. State, 314 Ark. 257, 261, 863 S.W.2d 259, 260-61 (1993).
Davis, 314 Ark. at 260, 863 S.W.2d at 260.
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Strickland required a new trial because his attorney failed to cite
a case indicating that a criminal defendant is “entitled to an
independent psychiatric examination.”42 The court disagreed and
held that even if Davis’s trial counsel cited that particular case,
there is no indication that it would have produced a different
outcome.43 Therefore, according to the court, Davis did not
receive inadequate representation.44
C. Stacey Johnson
In 1993, Stacey Johnson became the third man to join the
Arkansas Eight. In April of that year, Carol Heath was killed
while her two children, ages two and six, were home.45 Heath’s
daughter, the six-year-old, described the person who was in the
house as “‘a [b]lack man.’”46 After the incident, an officer
showed the six-year-old daughter two sets of pictures of black
males and she picked Stacey Johnson both times.47 At trial, the
daughter could not testify due to resulting trauma from the
incident, but the trial court permitted the officer to testify as to
what the six-year-old told him after the incident.48 Johnson
argued on appeal that Strickland required a new trial because his
counsel failed to (1) present information regarding the six-yearold’s competency and recollection of that night, and (2) request
retesting of DNA evidence, among other Strickland claims.49 The
court held that counsel was not inadequate for failing to challenge
the daughter’s competency and for not attempting to retest the
42. Davis v. Norris, 423 F.3d 868, 877 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Coulter v. State, 304 Ark.
527, 804 S.W.2d 348 (1991)).
43. Davis v. Norris, 423 F.3d 868, 877-78 (8th Cir. 2005).
44. Id. at 878. In 2017, the Arkansas Supreme Court stayed Davis’s execution while
waiting on a decision from the United States Supreme Court. Alan Blinder, Court Decisions
Force Arkansas to Halt Execution, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 17, 2017), [https://perma.cc/5BX3M8WQ].
45. Johnson v. State (Johnson I), 326 Ark. 430, 434, 934 S.W.2d 179, 180 (1996).
46. Id. at 435, 934 S.W.2d at 180.
47. Id. at 437, 934 S.W.2d at 182.
48. Id. at 442-44, 934 S.W.2d at 184-86 (while the court held that the statements
regarding the photo lineup could not be classified as an excited utterance, the court did
classify the six-year-old’s statements as excited utterances, thus providing an exception to
the hearsay rule).
49. Johnson v. State (Johnson II), 356 Ark. 534, 541-43, 552, 157 S.W.3d 151, 15859, 165 (2004).
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DNA evidence.50 The court, however, did decide to retest the
evidence on other grounds.51
D. Ledell Lee
Like Stacey Johnson, Ledell Lee’s story also began in 1993.
A Pulaski County jury sentenced Ledell Lee to death for the
murder of Debra Reese.52 The jury rendered its verdict after
listening to the prosecution’s closing argument, wherein it stated
that “Lee ‘is a hunter. This is his habitat. And his prey were the
people of Jacksonville from 1990 to 1993. And the people of
Jacksonville didn’t even know they were being hunted.’”53 Lee’s
counsel responded in his closing: “who are we then to say that we
are going to kill Ledell Lee?”54 The prosecutor then rebutted with
“I will tell you who we are. We are the hunted.”55 Lee’s counsel
did not object.56 Although the circuit court scrutinized the
prosecutor’s statements as “improper,” the judge ruled that the
statements were not “so egregious and inflammatory that the
defendant was denied a fair trial[,]”57 and affirmed Lee’s
conviction, holding that Lee did not receive inadequate counsel.
58
The court reasoned that objecting during opening or closing
arguments is highly debated and that the decision to do so is
within the attorney’s discretion via trial strategy.59 At a hearing
for a new sentencing trial, his former trial representation testified
that he did not hear the prosecutor’s closing statement and did not
object because he “just missed it.”60 Despite the attorney’s own
50. Id. at 551-52, 157 S.W.3d at 164-65.
51. In 2017, the Arkansas Supreme Court stayed Johnson’s execution for postconviction DNA testing. Johnson v. State, 2017 Ark. 138, at *1.
52. Lee v. State, 2009 Ark. 255, at 1, 308 S.W.3d 596, 599-600.
53. Id. at 19, 308 S.W.3d at 608.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Lee v. State, 2009 Ark. 255, at 19, 308 S.W.3d at 608.
58. Id. at 20, 308 S.W.3d at 608.
59. Id. at 19-20, 308 S.W.3d at 608; see also Buckley v. State, No. CR 06-172, 2007
WL 1509323, at *4 (Ark. May 24, 2007) (explaining “[e]xperienced advocates might differ
about when, or if, objections are called for because, as a matter of trial strategy, further
objections from counsel may succeed in making the comments seem more significant to the
jury.”).
60. Lee, 2009 Ark. 255, at 19, 308 S.W.3d at 608.
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admission that he “just missed it,” and the detrimental impact the
statements had on the jury, the court held that the jury’s sentence
would not have been different, because of the testimony about
Lee’s various violent crimes.61 Despite Lee’s claims, he was
executed on April 20, 2017.62
E. Marcel Williams
Marcel Williams, the fifth of the Arkansas Eight, not
surprisingly, also brought a Strickland claim.63 Marcel Williams
faced the death penalty for capital murder, kidnapping, rape, and
aggravated robbery.64 Ultimately, after hearing the evidence
along with the attorney’s arguments, the Pulaski County jury
convicted Marcel Williams of all charges and sentenced him to
death.65 In November of 1994, Williams met Stacy Errickson at
a Shellstop gas station.66 Williams forced Errickson into the front
passenger seat, drove her car away from the gas station, and made
her withdraw money in eighteen different transactions from
automated teller machines.67 Later that night, Williams raped and
killed Errickson.68 The Circuit Court appointed two attorneys for
Williams at trial, and an additional non-appointed attorney
volunteered to assist.69 Collectively, their strategy was to
“admit[] guilt to the jury and seek[] mercy through a punishment
of life without parole.”70 Despite the attorneys’ strategy,
Williams’ team failed to present any mitigating evidence of their
client’s “troubled background.”71 Williams advised his team of
attorneys about his lack of a good home life, previous time in the

61. Id. at 19-20, 308 S.W.3d at 608.
62. Pilkington & Rosenberg, supra note 5; see also Complaint, supra note 7; Andone,
supra note 7.
63. Williams v. State (Williams II), 347 Ark. 371, 373, 64 S.W.3d 709, 711 (2002).
64. Williams v. State (Williams I), 338 Ark. 97, 105-06, 991 S.W.2d 565, 569 (1999).
65. Id. at 106, 991 S.W.2d at 569.
66. Id. at 105, 991 S.W.2d at 568.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 109, 991 S.W.2d at 571.
69. Williams II, 347 Ark. 371, 374, 64 S.W.3d 709, 712 (2002).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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Department of Correction, and that he was allegedly raped while
in prison when he was just sixteen.72
At a post-conviction hearing assessing Williams’
insufficiency of counsel claim, trial counsel admitted that “they
felt they should have done things differently, . . . at the time of
trial, they did not know any other way to introduce the
[mitigating] information.”73
Additionally, Williams’ team
testified that they should have, after researching more about the
process of the mitigation phase, sought a psychologist to advise
the jury of Williams’ background.74 One of the attorneys even
admitted, “‘[I]t wasn’t that we didn’t have mitigation, [it was] that
we were ignorant of how to present it without exposing him.’”75
Because the attorneys indicated that they defended Marcel
Williams to the best of their ability “at the time with the
knowledge [that] they had[,]” the court evaluated the
representation’s performance from their mindset and conduct at
the time of trial.76 Despite the attorney’s unfamiliarity with the
process of presenting mitigating evidence, the court held that it
was a rational trial strategy that did not fall below an objective
standard of reasonableness.77 The court reasoned that a finding
of inadequate representation is without merit unless the defendant
provides actual evidence that might have “changed the mind of
one of the jurors.”78 Marcel Williams was ultimately executed on
April 24, 2017.79
F. Jack Jones
Jack Jones’ story began in 1995. A White County jury
sentenced Jack Jones to death for the capital murder and rape of
Mary Philips.80 In June of 1995, Jones went to Phillips’
72. Id.
73. Id. at 378, 64 S.W.3d at 715.
74. Marcel Williams II, 347 Ark. at 378, 64 S.W.3d at 715.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 379, 64 S.W.3d at 715.
78. Id. at 380, 64 S.W.3d at 716.
79. Ed Pilkington et al., Arkansas Carries Out First Double Execution in the US for 16
Years, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2017), [https://perma.cc/ADX7-MDRD].
80. Jones v. State (Jones II), 340 Ark. 1, 3-4, 8 S.W.3d 482, 483 (2000). Additionally,
the White County Jury convicted Jones of the attempted capital murder of Lacy Phillips, the

808

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73:4

workplace where she and her eleven-year-old daughter were
waiting to attend a 3:00 p.m. dentist appointment.81 However,
this was not Jones’ first visit to Phillips’ place of work; he visited
earlier that day to borrow a few books.82 During his second visit,
Jones robbed, raped, and killed Phillips, and seriously injured the
eleven-year-old.83 The police proceeded to Jones’s house and
arrested him as a result of the eleven-year-old’s description of the
attacker.84 Ultimately, Jones admitted to the crimes. 85
On appeal for the denial of post-conviction relief, Jones
argued that his attorney’s failure to object to the prosecutions’
aggravating statements to the jury that the murder was “especially
cruel or depraved[,]” and that Jones murdered Phillips to avoid or
prevent his arrest, rendered him ineffective counsel.86
Additionally, Jones argued that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the state’s expert witness for a hair analysis
found on Phillips.87 Jones argued that absent the expert’s
testimony, he may not have received a death sentence.88 Despite
this, the court affirmed his conviction and held that Jones received
adequate counsel.89 The court reasoned that the standard is not
“that his sentence could have been different” but rather “that [his]
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense.”90 Jack
Jones was executed on April 24, 2017.91

victim’s eleven-year-old daughter. Id.; Jones v. State (Jones I), 329 Ark. 62, 64, 947 S.W.2d
339, 340 (1997).
81. Jones I, 329 Ark. at 64, 947 S.W.2d at 340.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 64-5, 947 S.W.2d at 340.
84. Id. Lacy, the eleven-year-old, described Jones as having “a teardrop tattoo on his
face and more tattoos on his arm.” Id. at 64, 947 S.W.2d at 340.
85. Id. at 65, 947 S.W.2d at 340. Jones indicated that he attacked Phillips and her
daughter because “his wife had been raped, and that the police had done nothing about it.”
Id.
86. Jones II, 340 Ark. 1, 5, 8 S.W.3d 482, 484 (2000).
87. Id. at 10, 8 S.W.3d at 487.
88. Id. at 10, 8 S.W.3d at 488.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Ed Pilkington et al., supra note 79.
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G. Jason McGehee
Jason McGehee joined the Arkansas Eight in 1996.
McGehee inhabited a house with four other people, including
fifteen-year-old John Melbourne, Jr.92 The five used stolen
checks and property to buy things for themselves.93 Melbourne,
upon order from McGehee, attempted to buy shoes with a stolen
check, when he was apprehended by the police.94 After
Melbourne informed the police about the stolen items at the
home, the police released him to his father.95 McGehee and the
other inhabitants hid in the house and watched while the police
took possession of the stolen items.96 That night, Melbourne was
murdered.97
McGehee argued on appeal that Strickland required a new
trial because his counsel failed to request a jury instruction
indicating that McGehee had accomplices.98 Although the court
found that McGehee’s counsel rendered deficient performance,99
counsel’s failure to seek a jury instruction for accomplices “did
not make any difference in the result of the trial.”100 In August of
2017, Governor Hutchinson granted McGehee clemency,
reducing his sentence to life without parole.101
92. McGehee v. State, 348 Ark. 395, 399, 72 S.W.3d 867, 869 (2002).
93. Id. at 399-400, 72 S.W.3d at 869.
94. Id. at 400, 72 S.W.3d at 869-70.
95. Id. at 400, 72 S.W.3d at 870.
96. Id.
97. McGehee v. State, 348 Ark. 395, 400, 72 S.W.3d 867, 870 (2002). Melbourne
underwent a horrific beating in two different locations involving numerous types of torture.
Id. at 400-02, 72 S.W.3d at 870-71. Testimony at trial indicated that the group “agreed that
Melbourne needed to be taught a lesson. They decided that upon Melbourne’s return, they
would beat him to teach him not to ‘snitch.’” Id. at 400, 72 S.W.3d at 870.
98. Id. at 403-04, 72 S.W.3d at 872.
99. The court held that “[e]ven though we hold that the issue of accomplice liability
should have been submitted to the jury, had counsel so requested, relief under Rule 37 is not
required.” Id. at 409, 72 S.W.3d at 875. Additionally, “even if Campbell and Diemert had
been found to be accomplices, their testimony would have been corroborated by other
evidence tending to connect McGehee with the commission of Melbourne’s murder.” Id. at
412, 72 S.W.3d at 878.
100. Id. at 413, 72 S.W.3d at 878.
101. Max Brantley, Hutchinson Favors Clemency for Jason McGehee, ARK. TIMES
(Aug. 25, 2017), [https://perma.cc/NBP5-LU36]. McGehee was set for execution on April
27, 2017; however, the Arkansas Parole Board recommended clemency, which delayed his
execution. Id.. Governor Asa Hutchinson stated “[m]y intent to grant clemency to Mr.
McGehee is based partly on the recommendation of the Parole Board to commute his
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H. Kenneth Williams
Kenneth Williams’ Arkansas Eight story began in 1999.
Upon his arrival at the Arkansas Department of Correction for a
different set of crimes,102 Williams escaped.103 Williams ran
across the highway and found Genie and Cecil Boren’s home,
where Cecil was alone.104 Genie later found Cecil near the house,
dead.105 A neighbor, who Williams asked for directions,
recognized the vehicle that Williams was driving as Cecil’s.106
The police pulled Williams over in Missouri, but Williams drove
off and hit a water truck, subsequently killing the water truck
driver.107 Williams attempted to flee on foot but was captured by
the police.108 A Lincoln Circuit Court jury convicted Williams
and sentenced him to death for the capital-murder conviction and
forty years for the theft.109 On appeal from post-conviction relief,
Williams argued that Strickland requires a new trial because his
counsel failed to remove a juror for cause, among other claims.110
During voir dire, a juror, who was ultimately chosen, told the
attorneys that “in certain situations death is the only appropriate
punishment. She also said that she ‘felt very strong about [the
death penalty],’ and that she ‘[felt] as though. . .the person that
sentence from Death to Life Without Parole. . . . In making this decision I considered many
factors including the entire trial transcript, meetings with members of the victim’s family
and the recommendation of the Parole Board. In addition, the disparity in sentence given to
Mr. McGehee compared to the sentences of his co-defendants was a factor in my decision,
as well.” Id. Additionally, McGehee’s attorney commented, “Jason’s case offers a prime
example of why clemency is a necessary part of capital sentencing.” Id.
102. In September of 1999, Williams was sentenced to life without parole for “capital
murder, attempted capital murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, theft, and arson[.]”
Williams v. State (Kenneth Williams I), 347 Ark. 728, 737, 67 S.W.3d 548, 552-53 (2002).
103. Id. at 737-38, 67 S.W.3d at 553. Williams was released from his cell to make a
“religious call” when he slipped into a “slop tank[],” which was used to transport items in
and out of the prison. Id. at 738, 67 S.W.3d at 553. When outside of the prison, Williams
jumped out of the tank and hid in a ditch, where he later ran across the highway and into a
home. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 739, 67 S.W.3d at 554.
107. Kenneth Williams I, 347 Ark. 728, 739, 67 S.W.3d 548, 554 (2002).
108. Id.
109. Williams v. State (Kenneth Williams II), 369 Ark. 104, 107, 251 S.W.3d 290, 292
(2007).
110. Id. at 107-08, 111, 251 S.W.3d at 292-93, 295.
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commit[ted] the crime should. . .pay the price for it.’”111
Williams’s counsel later admitted that he would have challenged
this juror if he had any challenges left.112 Despite this juror
expressing that she “favor[ed] the death penalty,” the court held
that because there was not a reasonable probability of a different
outcome, Williams was not prejudiced and therefore received
sufficient counsel.113
“Four men won court stays, three were executed.”114
II.
Part II first explores Strickland v. Washington, the seminal
Supreme Court case detailing the standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel. It then explores how Arkansas courts
utilize the Strickland standard by considering the stories of
current Arkansas death row inmates.
A. Strickland Story
The story begins with David Washington. In September of
1976, Washington committed numerous crimes over a twelve-day
period, including murder, theft, and assault.115 The trial court
appointed William Tunkey—an “experienced criminal lawyer”—
as Washington’s defense counsel.116 Despite Tunkey advising
Washington to remain silent, Washington confessed and pleaded
guilty to all charges.117 The trial court sentenced Washington to
three death sentences and multiple years of imprisonment.118
The “experienced” Tunkey did not agree with Washington’s
choice to confess and “experienced a sense of hopelessness.”119
111. Id. at 111, 251 S.W.3d at 295.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 113, 251 S.W.3d at 296.
114. Melanie Eversley & John Bacon, Arkansas Executes 4th Inmate in 8 Days, USA
TODAY (Apr. 28, 2017), [https://perma.cc/29NW-M4KV] (emphasis added).
115. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1984).
116. Id. at 672; Brian R. Gallini, The Historical Case for Abandoning Strickland, 94
NEB. L. REV. 302, 304 (2015).
117. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672.
118. Id. at 675.
119. Id. at 672.
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This hopelessness led to a series of concerning behaviors perhaps
best relayed by Richard Shapiro, Washington’s appellate
counsel.120 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, Shapiro
argued that six specific illustrations of Tunkey’s representation
best exemplified his ineffectiveness:121
Tunkey failed to request a continuance following
Washington’s guilty plea to give himself a reasonable amount of
time to prepare for the sentencing hearing.122
Tunkey failed to seek a psychiatric evaluation of his
client.123
Tunkey “failed to investigate and present character
witnesses.”124
Tunkey failed to seek an investigation report prior to the
sentencing.125
Tunkey failed to submit a “meaningful” argument during the
sentencing phase of the trial to the court.126
Tunkey failed to obtain an “independent medical
examination” and “failed to cross-examine the State’s medical
experts.”127
The question before the Supreme Court, following a winding
road of appellate history, was whether Tunkey provided
“effective” assistance of counsel.128 It preliminarily observed that
“[t]he Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of
counsel because it envisions counsel’s playing a role that is
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just
results.”129 It then settled on a two-prong standard to evaluate
whether a criminal defendant received constitutionally adequate
representation: first, whether “counsel’s performance was
120. Gallini, supra note 116, at 319.
121. Gallini, supra note 116, at 317.
122. Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285, 286 (Fla. 1981); Gallini, supra note 116, at
317.
123. Washington, 397 So. 2d at 286; Gallini, supra note 116, at 317.
124. Washington, 397 So. 2d at 286 (emphasis added); Gallini, supra note 116, at 317
(emphasis added).
125. Washington, 397 So. 2d at 286; Gallini, supra note 116, at 317.
126. Washington, 397 So. 2d at 286; Gallini, supra note 116, at 317.
127. Washington, 397 So. 2d at 286 (emphasis added); Gallini, supra note 116, at 317
(emphasis added).
128. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
129. Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
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deficient,” and second, whether the attorney’s performance
“prejudiced” the defendant.130
Applying the new standard, the Court upheld Washington’s
convictions and sentence.131 In construing Tunkey’s performance
as constitutionally reasonable, Justice O’Connor, writing for a
majority of the Court, reasoned that Tunkey’s failures were
justifiably related to his “sense of hopelessness” about
Washington’s case following the latter’s confession.132 The
Court further reasoned that although Tunkey was experienced in
representing capital defendants, he reasonably viewed
Washington’s case as beyond repair and, therefore, did not fully
participate in Washington’s sentencing proceedings.133 Even if
Tunkey’s representation was ineffective, the Court noted,
Washington was not prejudiced by that performance given the
overwhelming evidence against him.134
B. Arkansas: Blurring the Line Between Harmful and
Harmless Errors
“When a defendant challenges a death sentence. . .the question is
whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors,
the sentencer. . .would have concluded that the balance of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant
death.” 135
The sheer volume of Arkansas Strickland cases brought by
convicted defendants is overwhelming.136 Although certain
attorney errors may indeed “prejudice” a defendant’s case,
Arkansas courts usually classify these attorney “errors” as mere

130. Id. at 687.
131. Id. at 700.
132. Id. at 699.
133. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 699 (1984).
134. Id. at 698-700. The sentencing judge determined that the death penalty would be
proper “even if respondent had no significant prior criminal history, [as] no substantial
prejudice resulted from the absence at sentencing of the character evidence offered in the
collateral attack.” Id. at 677.
135. Id. at 695 (emphasis added).
136. The volume of cases involving Strickland claims includes both capital and noncapital cases; however, this Article focuses solely on death cases.
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trial strategy.137 Courts have characterized attorney errors as
“[m]atters of trial strategy and tactics, even if arguably
improvident, [they] fall within the realm of counsel’s professional
judgment and are not grounds for a finding of ineffective
assistance of counsel.”138 With the application of a “strong
presumption” that every defense attorney’s conduct is within the
vast scope of “reasonable professional judgement,” a defendant,
essentially, must show that his representation had virtually no
strategy for trial.139
In Arkansas specifically, Strickland’s litigation presence
transcends the “Arkansas Eight.” Thirty inmates currently sit on
death row in Arkansas and they are together connected by one
thing: a Strickland claim.140 Their claims, though varied,
generally fall into one of three categories of attorney malfeasance:
(1) failure to object, (2) failure to prepare for trial, and (3) failure
to present mitigating evidence.

137. See generally Buckley v. State, No. CR 06-172, 2007 WL 1509323, at *4 (Ark.
May 24, 2007).
138. Id.
139. State v. Barrett, 371 Ark. 91, 96, 98, 263 S.W.3d 542, 546, 548 (2007) (holding
that the defendant received insufficient representation when counsel failed to craft a trial
strategy and had never tried a capital case).
140. Death Row, ARK. DEP’T OF CORRS. (Aug. 23, 2018), [https://perma.cc/NLH5WVR2]. Currently, there are thirty inmates on death row; however, three of the thirty
inmates—Brad Smith, Eric Reid, and Scotty Gardner—were recently sentenced and have yet
to file for post-conviction relief. Motion for Continuance, Smith v. State, No. CR20-86 (Ark.
Feb. 10, 2020); Reid v. State, No. CR-18-517 (Ark. June 15, 2018); Gardner v. State, No.
CR-19-257 (Ark. Nov. 1, 2019). It is highly likely that these three death row inmates will
file for post-conviction relief. Additionally, inmate Billy Thessing’s record is sealed;
however, through the unsealed records, it is clear that the inmate sought post-conviction
relief for ineffective assistance of counsel. Thessing v. State, No. CR-05-420 (Ark. Apr. 13,
2005). Finally, inmate Mauricio Torres was retried in February of 2020; however, another
mistrial ensued, and he will be re-tried again. Tracy Neal, Judge Sets Retrial Date for
Northwest Arkansas Man Accused of Killing Son, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Oct. 8, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/V3C7-4DQG]; Courthouse Scuffle Leads to Mistrial in Mauricio Torres’
Case, 5 NEWS (Mar. 5, 2020), [https://perma.cc/6Z3X-UJTW].
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1. Failure to Object 141
“The defense should at least indicate its concern . . .”142
First, failing to object is prejudicial to a defendant’s case and
detrimental to a jury or judge’s view of the faith the attorney has
in his or her client. “‘Objections can be made to questions,
answers, exhibits, and virtually anything else that occurs during a
trial.’”143 Without an objection, a jury must interpret the
prosecutor’s arguments as true and within the rules of evidence.144
Many death row attorneys indicate that they will not object
because they do not want to “highlight[] the comment and ma[ke]
the jury, which might not have understood the significance of the
remark [initially] [and] pay attention to it [instead].”145 Although
courts have held that a lack of objection during closing arguments
is a reasonable trial strategy,146 many statements that go without
objection reflect poorly on the defendant. Most notably, the
closing argument allows each side to refine the evidence and issue
to the jury.147 Because the closing argument is crucial for a side
to achieve success, a criminal prosecutor must remember his or
her influential role for the public at large. The Supreme Court has
even articulated that prosecutors shall “prosecute with
earnestness and vigor. . . . But, while he may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”148 Stated differently,
141. While this article profiles only two death row inmates under the failure to object
category, the other current death row inmates who share this claim include Randy Gay and
Jerry D. Lard. Brief of Appellant, Gay v. State, No. CR-19-762 (Ark. Feb. 7, 2020); Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief, Lard v. State, No. CR-2012-173 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Greene Cnty. Jan.
29, 2015).
142. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: POSTINVESTIGATION 600 (2d ed. 2009) (emphasis added).
143. Craig Lee Montz, Trial Objections from Beginning to End: The Handbook for
Civil and Criminal Trials, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 243, 246 (2002) (quoting MAUET, TRIAL
TECHNIQUES 262 (2000)).
144. See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 142 (explaining that objections to
improper statements made by opposing counsel during closing arguments should be made).
145. Sasser v. State, 338 Ark. 375, 391, 993 S.W.2d 901, 910 (1999).
146. LAFAVE, ET AL., supra note 142, at 600. “In some localities, immediate
objections to improper closing arguments are expected, while others consider it a matter of
common curtesy, verging on obligation, for opposing counsel not to interrupt one another’s
closing arguments by objections.” Id.
147. Id. at 595.
148. Id. at 596-97 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
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without objection, the defense substantially decreases its chance
to zealously argue on behalf of an inmate.149
Failure to object is best illustrated by Jack Greene’s story.
Current death row inmate Jack Greene faces the death penalty for
a capital murder charge.150 The Johnson County jury sentenced
Greene to death; however, his sentence was reversed, and his case
was remanded for re-sentencing.151 During re-sentencing, the
jury, again, sentenced Greene to death after the prosecutor, in his
final closing argument, declared:
If someone comes into our community from off somewhere
and does this to one of our citizens, I think we should tell them,
‘You get the maximum penalty here.’ Giving the maximum
penalty discourages and deters other people from doing things
like this to sixty nine year old retired ministers in Johnson
County.152
Greene’s attorney did not object.153 Greene argued that the
prosecution’s arguments painted him as “‘an outsider’” and
unconstitutionally compared him to an “illegal alien.”154
However, the reviewing court reasoned that although “racially
biased prosecutorial arguments” are unconstitutional, the sole
notion that Greene is an outsider did not stem from the
defendant’s race or his ethnicity, thus eliminating the
constitutional argument.155 Ultimately, due to the facts of the
crime, the court held that the attorney’s failure to object did not
influence the jury to the point of harming Greene.156 If the
attorney would have objected, the court noted, that objection

149. See generally id. at 600.
150. Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 63, 146 S.W.3d 871, 875 (2004).
151. Id. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed Greene’s prior murder charge
and conviction, which the jury in his Arkansas case “had considered as an aggravating
circumstance.” Id.
152. Id. at 68, 146 S.W.3d at 878-79.
153. Id. at 68, 146 S.W.3d at 879.
154. Greene, 356 Ark. at 69, 146 S.W.3d at 879 (citing United States v. Cruz-Padilla,
227 F.3d 1064 (8th Cir. 2000)).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 70, 146 S.W.3d at 879-80. In Greene’s first case, the court held that “[t]he
evidence of a premeditated and deliberated murder is overwhelming, and, under such
circumstances, the trial error was harmless.” Id., 146 S.W.3d at 879.
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would have been “meritless” and, in any event, did not merit
finding Greene’s representation constitutionally inadequate.157
Moreover, in 1994, Andrew Sasser’s story also presents an
attorney’s failure to object during the prosecutor’s closing
argument.158 Sasser faced the death penalty for the felony murder
of Jo Ann Kennedy.159 The prosecution, during closing argument,
harped on Sasser’s “lack of remorse” for his actions.160 The
prosecutor’s statements posed rhetorical questions to the jury
about whether they felt he was remorseful for the death of
Kennedy.161 For instance, the prosecutor argued “that there is no
role for mercy in the criminal justice system.”162 The court
attempted to justify the prosecutor’s statements, commenting that
“[s]everal [of the prosecutor’s] remarks look worse on paper than
they did in the courtroom. . . . [The statements] were more a way
of speaking than a flat statement and were understood as the
prosecutor’s opinion about the evidence that was
presented. . . .”163 The reviewing court reasoned that although
some of the prosecutor’s comments were “‘technically
objectionable,’” the court did not believe that the statements were
prejudicial to the jury because of the “overwhelming” evidence
presented against Sasser.164 During a post-conviction hearing,
defense counsel testified that he rarely objects during the
prosecution’s closing argument.165 Counsel did, however, testify

157. Id. at 70, 146 S.W.3d at 880 (citing Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d
352 (2003)). Greene brought other claims for ineffective assistance of counsel including his
attorney’s failure to seek live testimony during the penalty phase, failure “to make a proper
objection to an improper interpretation of an Arkansas law,” failure to challenge testimony
made by the medical examiner, and failure to raise a constitutional argument regarding the
introduction of “a T-shirt inscribed ‘If you love someone, set them free. If they don’t come
back, hunt them down and shoot them.’” Id. at 63, 146 S.W.3d at 875.
158. Sasser v. State, 338 Ark. 375, 388, 993 S.W.2d 901, 909 (1999). Andrew Sasser
also brought ineffective counsel claims for failure to object to the omission of an element
from a jury instruction, failure to object to the testimony from a prior victim, failure to seek
a limiting instruction, and the lack of representation by two attorneys. Id. at 382-95, 993
S.W.2d at 905-12.
159. Id. at 379, 993 S.W.2d at 903.
160. Id. at 389, 993 S.W.2d at 909.
161. Id.
162. Sasser, 338 Ark. at 389, 993 S.W.2d at 909.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 390, 993 S.W.2d at 910 (emphasis added).
165. Id.
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that he would have objected if the prosecution’s statements were
“‘absolutely outrageous.’”166
2. Failure to Prepare for Trial 167
“Remember, as a lawyer in the case, you should know much
more about your case than the Court.”168
Preparation is defined as “the act or process of getting
ready. . . . The type of preparation needed for a particular work
varies.”169 Preparation is key to trial success170 and adequate
representation. “Trial lawyers have a singular goal: to persuade
juries.”171 Without adequate preparation and investigation into
the case, this goal is essentially unachievable.172 Mitigation is
central to any capital case, requiring more preparation and
investigation into what a lawyer can argue during the penalty
phase of the trial.173 The type of preparation for the guilt and
penalty phases are vastly different.174 For the guilt phase, the
attorney focuses on the evidence and the law, while in the penalty
phase, an attorney must present the defendant’s medical and
social history.175 The art of preparation for a capital case requires
unique skills that non-capital attorneys may not possess.176

166. Id. at 390-91, 993 S.W.2d at 910.
167. While this Article profiles only two death row inmates under the failure to prepare
for trial category, the other current death row inmates who share this claim include Ray
Dansby and Latavious D. Johnson. Dansby v. State, 350 Ark. 60, 84 S.W.3d 857 (2002);
Johnson v. State, 2020 Ark. 168, 598 S.W.3d 515.
168. Fred Daugherty, The Importance of Pre-Trial Preparation, STUDENT L. J., Feb.
1961, at 13, 14 (emphasis added).
169. Preparation Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, [https://perma.cc/VC5LEU94] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (emphasis added).
170. THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 499 (5th ed. 2000).
171. David Berg, The Trial Lawyer, 31 LITIGATION 8, 8 (2005).
172. See id.
173. Miriam S. Gohara, Grace Notes: A Case for Making Mitigation the Heart of
Noncapital Sentencing, 41 AM. J. CRIM. L. 41, 41 (2013). “[F]amiliarity with the mitigating
force of social history may serve as a powerful basis for empathy and amelioration. . . .” Id.
at 42.
174. LINDA E. CARTER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 266
(4th ed. 2018).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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In Arkansas, failures to prepare for capital proceedings are
abundant in scope.177 Failure to prepare for trial is illustrated
through Zachariah Marcyniuk’s story. In 2008, a Washington
County jury convicted Marcyniuk of Katie Wood’s murder.178
Marcyniuk went to Wood’s home, grabbed her, and stabbed her
For trial, Marcyniuk hired private
with a knife.179
representation.180 Marcyniuk’s counsel’s strategy was to assert
the “mental disease or defect defense” during both his opening
and closing statements at trial.181 However, Marcyniuk’s counsel
asked the jury to return a verdict for second-degree murder,
essentially voiding his own defense strategy.182
At a post-conviction relief hearing, Marcyniuk’s counsel
testified that his strategy was to use the mental disease or defect
defense as mitigating evidence, not as a full defense.183 However,
during the penalty phase of the trial, Marcyniuk’s attorney did not
investigate or call the mitigating witnesses which Marcyniuk
provided.184 Marcyniuk argued that the addition of the testimony
would have prompted at least one juror to choose life in prison
over the death penalty.185 His representation failed to investigate
what the witnesses would have testified to and decided that
“‘there is a problem with putting your friends on in mitigation, as
they would essentially testify that they did not recognize that you
were especially anxiety ridden or depressed[.]’”186 The court
affirmed the conviction and held that he received adequate
representation.187 The court reasoned that “[e]ven though the jury

177. See, e.g., Dansby v. State, 350 Ark. 60, 84 S.W.3d 857 (2002); Johnson v. State,
2020 Ark. 168, 598 S.W.3d 515; Marcyniuk v. State, 2014 Ark. 268, 436 S.W.3d 122; Kemp
v. Kelley (Kemp II), 924 F.3d 489 (8th Cir. 2019).
178. Marcyniuk, 2014 Ark. 268, at 1, 436 S.W.3d at 125.
179. Id. at 2, 436 S.W.3d at 125.
180. Id. at 3, 436 S.W.3d at 126.
181. See id. at 4, 436 S.W.3d at 126.
182. See id. at 6, 436 S.W.3d at 127; Court Upholds Man’s Conviction, Death Sentence
in Slaying of UA Student, ARK. NEWS (June 5, 2014), [https://perma.cc/38DD-4563].
183. Marcyniuk v. State, 2014 Ark. 268, at 8-10, 436 S.W.3d 122, 129-30; Court
Upholds Man’s Conviction, Death Sentence in Slaying of UA Student, supra note 182.
184. Marcyniuk, 2014 Ark. 268, at 19, 436 S.W.3d at 135.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 19-20, 436 S.W.3d at 135.
187. Id. at 20, 436 S.W.3d at 135-36.
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was not persuaded by [counsel’s] trial tactics” Marcyniuk’s
attorney’s strategy and decisions were “reasonable.”188
Similarly, in 1993, failure to prepare for trial is evident in
Timothy Kemp’s case. A Pulaski County jury sentenced Kemp
to death for the murders of David Wayne Helton, Robert Phegley,
Cheryl Phegley, and Richard Falls.189 Kemp argued that
Strickland required a new trial because his attorney failed to
adequately investigate his “childhood abuse, fetal-alcohol
exposure, and post-traumatic stress disorder.”190 Although his
trial attorney presented mitigating witnesses and evidence during
the penalty phase who discussed Kemp’s history with alcohol and
abuse, the jury chose death over life.191 Later, in Kemp’s hearing
in federal court for habeas corpus review, the Federal District
Court judge recalled that “Kemp presented compelling evidence
not introduced at trial: a deep family history of poverty and mental
illness; a routine of trauma during childhood; and Kemp’s mother
[] drank alcohol heavily when she was pregnant with him.”192
Despite this, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the
state courts and affirmed Kemp’s sentence, holding that Kemp’s
trial counsel took reasonable measures to satisfy his duty to
investigate under Strickland.193

188. Id. at 20, 436 S.W.3d at 136.
189. Kemp v. State (Kemp I), 324 Ark. 178, 186, 919 S.W.2d 943, 946 (1996).
190. Kemp II, 924 F.3d 489, 497 (8th Cir. 2019); Max Brantley, Appeals Courts
Sustain Two Capital Murder Cases in Arkansas, ARK. TIMES (May 16, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/6L8B-2Y49].
191. Kemp I, 324 Ark. 178, 186, 919 S.W.2d 943, 946 (1996).
192. Kemp II, 924 F.3d 489, 497-98 (8th Cir. 2019) (internal quotations omitted).
193. Id. at 503.
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3. Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence 194
“Mitigation evidence enables the sentencer to consider the life
and circumstances of the particular defendant in deciding
whether death or life is the appropriate sentence.”195
Finally, mitigation is a central part of an attorney’s job when
representing a defendant facing the death penalty. Mitigation is
“[a] reduction in how harmful, unpleasant, or seriously bad a
situation is; a lessening in severity or intensity.”196 The public
empowers each juror to decide which pieces of evidence mitigate
the maximum sentence before awarding an appropriate
punishment.197 No textbook can teach an attorney how to
convince a juror to recommend a life sentence over the death
penalty,198 but it is defense counsel’s job to try.199
Mitigation took center stage in Terrick Nooner’s story. A
Pulaski County jury sentenced Terrick Nooner to death for capital
murder.200 Nooner met a college student, Scott Stobaugh, at a
laundromat in March of 1993.201 Later that day, a surveillance
camera recorded Nooner shoot Stobaugh.202 During the penalty
phase of the trial, the prosecutor presented evidence of Nooner’s
prior robbery charge, intending it to be an aggravating
circumstance.203 Although Nooner informed his counsel that the
194. While this article profiles only three death row inmates under the failure to present
mitigating evidence category, the other current death row inmates who share this claim
include: Karl D. Roberts (Roberts v. State, 2020 Ark. 45, 592 S.W.3d 675), Alvin Jackson
(Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d 352 (2003)), Roderick Rankin (Rankin v. State,
365 Ark. 225, 227 S.W.3d 924 (2006)), Kenneth Isom (Isom v. State, 2010 Ark. 495, 370
S.W.3d 491), Thomas Springs (Springs v. State, 2012 Ark 87, 387 S.W.3d 143), Gregory
Decay (Decay v. State, 2014 Ark. 387, 441 S.W.3d 899), Brandon Lacy (State v. Lacy, 2016
Ark. 38, 480 S.W.3d 856), Zachary Holly (Petition for Relief Under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37,
State v. Holly, No. 04CR-13-1 (May 18, 2018)), Mickey Thomas (Thomas v. State, 2014
Ark. 123, 431 S.W.3d 923), and Derek Sales (Sales v. State, 2013 Ark. 218, 2013 WL
2295436).
195. CARTER, supra note 174, at 181 (emphasis added).
196. Mitigation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
197. CARTER, supra note 174, at 266.
198. See generally id. at 266.
199. Id. at 266.
200. Nooner v. State, 339 Ark. 253, 255, 4 S.W.3d 497, 498 (1999).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 258-59, 4 S.W.3d at 500.
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prior robbery charge was reduced to a lesser offense due to his
protection of a victim during the robbery, counsel did not present
that mitigating evidence to the jury during the penalty phase.204
At the post-conviction hearing for relief, Nooner’s trial
representation had no recollection of the reduced robbery.205 In
denying Nooner’s request for post-conviction relief, the court
held that even if Nooner’s representation knew, there was no
reasonable probability that the jury’s decision would have
changed if they knew about the changes to Nooner’s prior robbery
charge.206
Perhaps the most glaring example of an attorney’s failure to
present mitigating evidence occurred when the Arkansas
Supreme Court reversed the death sentence for Kenneth Reams.
In 1993, a Jefferson County jury sentenced Reams to death
following his involvement in the death of Gary Turner.207 Reams’
co-defendant, Alford Goodwin, was convicted and sentenced to
life in prison for Turner’s shooting before Reams went to trial.208
Essentially, counsel for Reams sought to blame Goodwin during
Reams’ trial, although counsel later “testified that ‘[he didn’t]
know when [Goodwin] pled in relation to [Reams’] trial.’”209
Moreover, counsel declined to have Goodwin testify during the
penalty phase.210 The court held that this constituted inadequate
assistance of counsel.211
Most recently, in 2019, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals
declined to reverse a death penalty sentence for Justin Anderson
on Strickland grounds.212 Although the jury heard forty-two
potential mitigating factors at the penalty phase, the jury did not
consider any viable.213 The defense provided a multitude of
mitigating factors to the jury; however, many were “duplicative,”
204. Id.
205. Nooner v. State, 339 Ark. 253, 258-59, 4 S.W.3d 497, 500 (1999).
206. Id.
207. Reams v. State, 2018 Ark. 324, at 1-2, 560 S.W.3d 441, 445.
208. Id. at 2, 560 S.W.3d at 445.
209. Max Brantley, Death Penalty Reversed in Pine Bluff Killing for Ineffective
Defense, ARK. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), [https://perma.cc/T8YS-Q6EA].
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Anderson v. Kelley, 938 F.3d 949, 954-55 (8th Cir. 2019).
213. Id. at 953.
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including Anderson’s lack of a stable home life, and the fact that
he lived in nine different places before he was sixteen.214 While
his defense provided numerous duplicative mitigating factors,
Anderson’s counsel failed to present evidence of Anderson’s fetal
alcohol spectrum disorder.215 Anderson argues that the addition
of this mitigating circumstance could have pushed the jury to
choose life.216 However, the court held that Anderson did not
provide to the court “a reasonable probability that the jury ‘would
have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances did not warrant death.’”217
However, one judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, pointed out that the defense counsel’s presentation of fortytwo repetitive mitigating factors was not helpful.218 Additionally,
he added that “[i]t’s not just the quantity, but the quality of
mitigating evidence that can make the difference between life and
death.”219 Ultimately, counsel did not conduct a thorough
investigation to reveal all the possible mitigating factors because
they failed to present that “Anderson’s childhood was soaked in
alcohol[.]”220 Anderson, indeed, had fetal alcohol spectrum
disorder due to the excessive amount of alcohol his mother
consumed while she was pregnant which continued during the
early years of Anderson’s life.221 In fact, the capital defense bar
community and its leaders encourage attorneys to use fetal
alcohol spectrum disorder as a mitigating circumstance.222
Although counsel knew that Anderson’s mother drank alcohol,
they failed to further inquire about or investigate additional

214. See id. at 958, 964-65.
215. Anderson v. Kelley, 938 F.3d 949, 964-65 (8th Cir. 2019) (Kobes, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
216. Id. at 954.
217. Id. at 958.
218. Id. at 953, 964-65 (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
219. Id. at 965 (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
220. Anderson v. Kelley, 938 F.3d 949, 963 (8th Cir. 2019) (Kobes, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
221. Id. (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
222. Id. at 964. (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Arkansas has used
FASD as a defense beginning around 1995 with Miller v. State. Id. (citing Miller v. State,
328 Ark. 121, 942 S.W.2d 825, 828 (1997)) (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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mitigating circumstances.223 Anderson’s representation even
acknowledged, “evidence of FASD would have fit perfectly with
the theme of the mitigation defense. . . not just that Anderson had
a horrible childhood, but that it changed him physically.”224 The
dissent concluded that the attorney’s behavior violated the Sixth
Amendment.225
Mitigation is arguably the most important evidence an
attorney can present for a death defendant. Mitigation also comes
in many forms.226 Mitigation essentially demonstrates a
“meaningful way to reject the death penalty[.]”227 Stated more
plainly, mitigation is the attorney’s chance to persuade the jury to
choose life for the defendant instead of the death penalty.
Unfortunately, mistakes made by attorneys in the penalty phase
are numerous and warrant reform.
III.
“Supposed to be reserved for the ‘worst of the worst’
defendants, the death penalty is handed down more often for
those with the worst lawyers—not the worst crimes.”228
Criticism has followed Strickland in the decades since its
issuance, particularly in the context of death litigation. And
perhaps rightly so. After all, an attorney representing a criminal
defendant facing the death penalty bears a tremendous
223. Id. at 962-63 (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Kobes
pointed out that the American Bar Association Guidelines state that, “[m]itigation cases
depend on ‘extensive and generally unparalleled investigation into personal and family
history’ that ‘begins with the moment of conception.’” Id. at 964 (citing ABA GUIDELINES
FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY
CASES (AM. BAR ASSOC. 2003), reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003)) (Kobes, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
224. Id. at 965 (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
225. Id. (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) “When counsel fail to ask
important questions [to their clients] and turn up crucial facts, that failure cannot be shifted
to experts.” Id. at 964 (Kobes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
226. LINDA E. CARTER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 181
(4th ed. 2018).
227. Id.
228. CASSANDRA STUBBS, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, THE DEATH PENALTY IN
2019: A YEAR OF INCREDIBLE PROGRESS MARRED BY UNCONSCIONABLE EXECUTIONS
(2019), [https://perma.cc/HFP9-V5GE] (emphasis added).
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responsibility.229 And in death penalty cases, competent counsel
is essential. This Article is about constitutionally guaranteed
process—not innocence or guilt. This Article does not purport
that the Arkansas defendants are innocent; rather, even if guilt is
present, each criminal defendant is constitutionally guaranteed
competent counsel.
While commentators have proposed a number of potential
solutions, this Article argues that the most favorable is a
straightforward approach: drop the second prong of the Strickland
standard in death cases. Section A discusses why funding is not
a permanent fix to extend death defendants “more” adequate
counsel. Section B, then, illustrates how the American Bar
Association’s requirements for competent counsel directly point
to dropping the second prong of Strickland. Finally, Section C
illustrates how the lack of a prejudice prong would alter the
outcome in the Arkansas Eight cases.

229. Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services
and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 357-58 (1995). See also Am. Bar
Ass’n, American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases , 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 967-68 (2003) (“[O]ne
study found that over the entire course of a case, defense attorneys in federal capital cases
bill for over twelve times as many hours as in noncapital homicide cases. In terms of actual
numbers of hours invested in the defense of capital cases, recent studies indicate that several
thousand hours are typically required to provide appropriate representation.”)
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A. Funding: The Cronic Problem
“[H]elping criminal defendants is not a high priority for the
public.”230
Civil suits and more money will not fix the problem. Public
defenders represent the bulk of criminal defendants.231 Because
of this, there is a “nationwide problem consist[ing] of ‘too little
money, too few attorneys, and too many defendants.’”232 In 2019
alone, there were 79,723 “active” criminal cases in Arkansas.233
40,634 of the 2019 cases involve “distinct individuals across the
state.”234 Of those distinct individuals, 26,499 were represented
by public defenders.235
In Arkansas, at any given time, many public defenders carry
between ninety and one-hundred-twenty cases, each, all at once
.236 Generally, that caseload collectively comprises about eightyfive to ninety percent of the entire criminal docket.237 No public
230. Bryan Altman, Improving the Indigent Defense Crisis Through
Decriminalization, 70 ARK. L. REV. 769, 782 (2017) (emphasis added). Altman also points
to a hearing from the Annual Conference of the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association. Id. at 782 n. 89. The transcript illustrates that no answer will be publicly
favored. Id.; AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE
FUNDING 10 (John Thomas Moran ed.,1982). At the hearing, a private practitioner
commented: “What I’m asking you all here today as members of the bar is to realize this is
a very very unpopular subject. There is no public support whatsoever. If we had to put it on
a referendum, how much money are the people of Massachusetts willing to pay for people
accused of crime, what would we get? $100? $200? Do you think we’d hit four figures? I
doubt it. . . . If we are not willing to stand up for our indigent clients, then we have to stand
up for the Constitutional guarantees of the right to counsel and equal protection of the law.”
Id. at 11.
231. Carrie Dvorak Brennan, The Public Defender System: A Comparative
Assessment, 25 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 237, 238 (2015).
232. Id.
233. E-mail from Joe Beard, Research Analyst & Tableau Server Adm’n for the
Arkansas Admin. Office of the Courts (Mar. 23, 2020, 08:20 CST) (on file with author).
Active is defined as cases that do not have a filed disposition. E-mail from Joe Beard,
Research Analyst & Tableau Server Adm’n for the Arkansas Admin. Office of the Courts
(Apr. 23, 2020, 1:07 CST) (on file with author).
234. E-mail from Joe Beard, Research Analyst & Tableau Server Adm’n for the
Arkansas Admin. Office of the Courts (Mar. 23, 2020, 08:20 CST) (on file with author).
235. Id.
236. David Koon, Arkansas Public Defenders Stretched Thin, ARK. TIMES (Jan. 29,
2015), [https://perma.cc/9L2W-9YNR].
237. Id. Each client also has multiple cases. Id. An Arkansas Budget committee
member “gave the scenario of a policeman who pulls over a car for no tags and eventually
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defender in those or similar circumstances could adequately
prepare his or her entire case-load for trial.238 The National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals
(NAC) recommends that one attorney should not manage more
than 150 felony cases per year.239 But, in Arkansas and
elsewhere, many public defenders surpass this.240
One managing public defender in Arkansas stated that public
defense “a lot of times, it’s just the assembly-line practice of
law.”241 This is not a new or surprising comment; there are
frequent calls for more resources and funding.242 Indeed, public
defenders nationwide face similar financial challenges and feel
that “It’s impossible for [them] to do a good job representing
[their] clients” because of budget cuts, staff reductions, and
access even to basic resources.243
But requests for increases to public defender funding raise a
separate concern about where the money to support those
increases will come from. But as many cases indicate, more
money is not the sole issue. Consider United States v. Cronic,244
arrests the person inside for DUI, possession of a handgun by a felon, possession of a stolen
handgun and possession of a controlled substance.” Id. While the number of cases does not
reflect only capital cases, the number reflects the multitude of directions that a public
defender is pulled in on a daily basis. See generally id.
238. Id. At the base-line level, to prepare for a jury trial, an attorney must meet with
his or her client, talk to all witnesses, send subpoenas to all witnesses that will give testimony,
hire expert witnesses if needed, prepare an opening statement, and prepare questions for
direct and cross examination. See generally id. “Because public defenders have so many
cases per year, they can spend only minutes on each individual case, compromising the level
of defense provided.” THOMAS GIOVANNI & ROOPAL PATEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
GIDEON AT 50: THREE REFORMS TO REVIVE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 4 (2013),
[https://perma.cc/PW57-C8TW].
239. NORMAN LEFSTEIN, AM. BAR ASS’N, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS:
ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE, 43 (2011). The NAC, which is funded by the federal
government, has a considerable impact on public defenders. Id. There is a lack of caseload
recommendations in the practice of law and NAC fills this gap. Id.
240. See generally Tina Peng, I’m a Public Defender. It’s Impossible for Me to Do a
Good Job Representing my Clients., WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), [https://perma.cc/UW9PCYXQ].
241. Koon, supra note 236.
242. See id.
243. Peng, supra note 240. See also GIOVANNI & PATEL, supra note 238, at 4 (“In
New Orleans, defenders handled on average 19,000 cases in 2009, which translated into
seven minutes per case. Minnesota defenders reported devoting an average of 12 minutes
per case, not including court time, in 2010.”); Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public
Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2008), [https://perma.cc/7AZD-F6KE].
244. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
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a case the United States Supreme Court decided on the same day
as Strickland.245 Just days before trial, Harrison Cronic’s counsel
withdrew, and the court appointed new counsel for Cronic.246 In
doing so, the court set trial for twenty-five days later, even though
the government had “four and one-half years to investigate [this]
case and. . .review[] thousands of documents during that
investigation.”247 The Supreme Court was tested with examining
whether Cronic’s newly-appointed representation adequately
prepared for trial.248 Although the Court held that twenty-five
days to prepare for trial provided sufficient time, it also
recognized that preparing a sufficient defense requires timely
appointment of knowledgeable counsel coupled with adequate
preparation time and resources prior to trial.249
That recognition mirrors the Court’s precedent established
in Powell v. Alabama,250 Wiggins v. Smith,251 Williams v.
245. Samantha Jaffe, “It’s Not You, It’s Your Caseload”: Using Cronic to Solve
Indigent Defense Underfunding, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1465, 1474 (2018).
246. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 649. In addition to the twenty-five-day disadvantage, the
“court appointed a young lawyer with a real estate practice” and no prior experience litigating
a jury trial. Id. at 649, 665. The court held that these mere factors regarding the attorney’s
qualifications did “not undermine[]” the conclusion. Id. at 665. The court went on to reason
that “[e]very experienced criminal defense attorney once tried his first criminal case.
Moreover, a lawyer’s experience with real estate transactions might be more useful in
preparing to try a criminal case involving financial transactions than would prior experience
in handling, for example, armed robbery prosecutions.” Id.
247. Id. at 649. Cronic argued that twenty-five days is an inadequate amount of time
to prepare for trial, as litigated in Powell v. Alabama. Jaffe, supra note 245, at 1474 (citing
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).
248. See generally Cronic, 466 U.S. at 650, 662.
249. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662-63, 665 (1984).
250. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
251. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Seventeen years after Strickland,
Wiggins v. Smith seemed to gently challenge the Strickland decision. Gallini, supra note
116, at 351-52. Surprisingly, Justice O’Connor, who authored the majority opinions in both
Strickland and Wiggins, refined her own opinion about Stickland prejudice. Id. at 319, 35152. Wiggins was convicted of capital murder, among other crimes, and was sentenced to
death. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515-16. Ultimately, Wiggins tasked the United States Supreme
Court with deciding whether his counsel provided adequate representation during trial. Id.
at 518-20. During that trial, counsel did not introduce any evidence of the defendant’s “life
history,” nor did he seek professional assistance to prepare a report of Wiggins’ background.
Gallini, supra note 116, at 352 (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 515 (2003)). Instead,
during counsel’s opening, he merely told the jury: “‘You’re going to hear that Kevin Wiggins
has had a difficult life. It has not been easy for him. . . . I think that’s an important thing for
you to consider.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515. That’s it. No details followed to describe his
“difficult life.” Gallini, supra note 116, at 352. Surprisingly, Justice O’Connor, unlike in
Strickland, concluded that the lack of investigation into a client’s life to gain mitigating
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Taylor,252 and Rompilla v. Beard,253 wherein it recognized that
failure to prepare, failure to present mitigating evidence, and
failure to gather mitigating evidence constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel.254 However, more money would not have
granted Cronic’s attorney more days to prepare. Cronic prompted
a series of litigation regarding the lack of funding;255 even so,
many public defenders still work hundreds of cases a year, utilize
minimal resources, and conduct nominal preparation.
B. ABA Standards Call to Eliminate Strickland Prejudice
The great weight of death penalty defense representation has
spurred the development of various and unique strategies for
effective defense representation in death litigation.256 Consider,
evidence “did not reflect reasonable professional judgement,” and, perhaps more
importantly, if counsel had presented the evidence of Wiggins’ background, “there is a
reasonable probability that [the jury] would have returned with a different sentence.” Id.
(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534, 536 (2003)). Her opinion reasoned that the
jury only heard a small slice of mitigating evidence; however, ”[h]ad the jury been able to
place petitioner’s excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a
reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance.” Id.
(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003)) (emphasis added).
252. See generally Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). In Williams, the
defendants counsel failed to research his client’s behavior, which later was found to possibly
have a mitigating effect. Jaffe, supra note 245, at 1475.
253. See generally Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). Just two years after
Wiggins, the Court again appeared to retreat from Strickland. See Gallini, supra note 116,
at 353. In Rompilla, a jury convicted Ronald Rompilla on all charges, including capital
murder. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 378. However, the jury rendered its verdict after counsel’s
failure to present significant mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. Id. at 381.
Defense counsel presented Rompilla’s five family members’ testimony as mitigating
evidence, but nothing else. Id. at 378. The Court held this rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel. Id. at 393. Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion focused on the
significance of looking into a defendant’s history. Gallini, supra note 116, at 353 (citing
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 394-96 (2005)) (O’Connor, J, concurring). Specifically,
for Rompilla, Justice O’Connor reasoned that defense counsel’s failure “‘was the result of
inattention, not reasoned strategic judgement.’” Gallini, supra note 116, at 353 (citing
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 395-96 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
254. See Jaffe, supra note 245, at 1475.
255. See e.g., Kuren v. Luzerne Cnty., 146 A.3d 715 (Pa. 2016); Hurrell-Harring et al.
v. State,
930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010); Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D.
Wash. 2013).
256. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Am. Bar Ass’n,
supra note 229, at 923 (quoting Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent
Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 357-58 (1995)).
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for instance, the guidance provided by the American Bar
Association:
[D]efending a capital case is an intellectually rigorous
enterprise, requiring command of the rules unique to capital
litigation and constant vigilance in keeping abreast of new
developments in a volatile and highly nuanced area of the law.257
Wholly apart from ABA guidance, capital defense attorneys,
typically, must first satisfy rigorous state-level qualifications in
order to handle capital cases.258 Despite quality assurance efforts,
no one remains happy with Strickland. Questions about defense
attorney competency therefore persists—and especially so in
Arkansas.
At the core of criminal representation is professional
competence. The commonality of death defendants manifests
itself through representation that falls below the standards
expected by the American Bar Association. Under the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, the American Bar Association
categorizes lawyer competency into four classifications: (1)
“Legal Knowledge and Skill,” (2) “Thoroughness and
Preparation,” (3) “Retaining or Contracting With Other
Lawyers,” and (4) “Maintaining Competence.”259 By eliminating
Strickland prejudice, death defendants will receive
constitutionally competent representation as outlined by the
American Bar Association’s professional conduct requirements.
Objecting, preparing for trial, and presenting mitigating
evidence all fit squarely within the categories of lawyer

257. Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 229, at 923 (quoting Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse
Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF.
L. REV. 329, 357-58 (1995)).
258. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5. In Arkansas, the requirement to qualify to be the lead
death penalty attorney is three years of experience practicing law, prior experience as lead
counsel in at least five jury trials regarding “complex cases,” and experience with at least
one case where the death penalty was sought. Id. These are the main qualifications to serve
as the lead attorney; however, there are a separate set of qualifications to serve on the defense
team. Id.
259. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r 1.1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2018) (emphasis
omitted).
Additionally, the rule itself expressly states, “A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” Id. (emphasis
omitted).
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competency requirements. The American Bar Association’s
second category, “Thoroughness and Preparation,” expressly
“includes adequate preparation.”260 Further, the thoroughness
and preparation requirements recognize the need to alter “[t]he
required attention and preparation are determined in part by what
is at stake. . . .”261 The rules also indicate that even if an attorney
is lacking in prior experience, the “lawyer can provide adequate
representation in a wholly novel field through necessary
study.”262 Compliance with professional conduct and ethics are
at the center of the legal profession.263 These rules ensure that
clients receive adequate and competent counsel.
Despite the Supreme Court’s attempt to provide a standard
for ineffective counsel in Strickland, the Court’s test continually
precludes meaningful appellate review of whether trial counsel
was, in fact, effective.264 Arkansas juries decided all of the
Arkansas Eight inmates’ cases discussed in this article, as well as
the remaining thirty Arkansas death row inmates.265 Juries are
unpredictable and, in any given case, may choose life over death,
or death over life, perhaps only on the basis of just one statement
from either side.266 In a capital case, the second prong, the
requirement to prove prejudice, is often an unattainable burden
which a post-conviction attorney must attempt to prove.
Without the need for an appellant litigant to prove the second
prong of Strickland, the stories of each Arkansas Eight defendant,
as well as other death row inmates, might have turned out
differently. In reliance on the second prong of the Strickland
standard, Arkansas courts uniformly concluded that all of the
Arkansas
Eight
received
constitutionally
accepted

260. Id. (emphasis omitted).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See generally Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, Standard Lawyer Behavior?
Professionalism as an Essential Standard for ABA Accreditation, 42 N.M. L. REV. 33 (2012).
“Lawyers must be able to represent and competently advocate for their clients without
succumbing to behavior that is not commensurate with the esteemed position of the
legal profession.” Id. at 43.
264. See infra Part I & Part II.
265. See infra Part I & Part II.
266. See generally Brian H. Bornstein & Edie Greene, Jury Decision Making:
Implications for and from Psychology, 20 ASS’N FOR PSYCHOL. SCI. 63 (2011).
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representation.267 From attorney errors regarding failure to
object, to failure to present mitigating evidence, to failure to
challenge a six-year-old’s testimony, the unavoidable question
arises: would the result have been different but for the prejudice
prong?268
C. Imagine the Executed Arkansas Eight Without Strickland
Prejudice
Consider how appellate review might proceed without
Strickland prejudice. Ledell Lee, Marcel Williams, Jack Jones,
and Kenneth Williams, were executed in April of 2017 without
Strickland prejudice.269 Recall the facts. Ledell Lee’s counsel
failed to object to the prosecution’s egregious statements to the
jury, which painted Lee as a “hunter,” because counsel admitted
that he “just missed it.”270 Nevertheless, the reviewing court held
no prejudice existed, and Lee was executed.271 Without the
requirement to address the prejudice prong, the reviewing court
would have focused solely on whether counsel provided
professionally reasonable representation. In Lee’s case, recall the
court’s conclusion that counsel’s lack of objection “was clearly
not part of his strategy because he testified at the August 2007
hearing that he ‘just missed it.’”272 Lee would, therefore, still be
alive and likely be awarded a new trial with different counsel.
More importantly, such a holding signals that the court demands
more from defense attorneys.
Next, recall that Marcel Williams’ counsel failed to present
mitigating evidence to the jury.273 Counsel testified during a postconviction review hearing that “[i]t wasn’t that [they] didn’t have
mitigation, [it was] that [they] were ignorant of how to present it

267. See Infra Part I for Arkansas Eight profiles.
268. See Infra Part I for Arkansas Eight profiles.
269. Jamiles Lartey, Arkansas Executions: Profiles of the Eight Death Row Prisoners,
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2017), [https://perma.cc/7UWE-QW8F]. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
270. Lee v. State, 2009 Ark. 255, at 19, 308 S.W.3d 596, 608.
271. Pilkington & Rosenberg, supra note 5.
272. Lee, 2009 Ark. 255, at 19-20, 308 S.W.3d at 608.
273. Williams v. State, 347 Ark. 371, 373, 64 S.W.3d 709, 711 (2002).
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without exposing him.”274 Despite that testimony, the court held
that counsel was nonetheless effective even though counsel also
testified that “they should have done things differently, they
admitted that, at the time of trial, they did not know any other way
to introduce the information about Williams’s troubled youth.”275
However, the reviewing court did not address the prejudice prong
because Williams made a conclusory argument for postconviction relief, which ultimately did not provide enough
specific information for the court’s liking.276 Without the
prejudice prong, a court may have put more weight on Williams’
counsel’s ignorance and awarded him a new trial. Marcel
Williams, however, was executed on April 24, 2017.277
Recall Jack Jones. Jones’ counsel failed to object to the
state’s expert witness as well as the flagrant statements by the
prosecution about the murder itself.278 Jones argued that without
the expert’s testimony and the statements, the outcome “could
have been different.”279 However, the reviewing court strictly
construed Strickland, commenting that the standard requires
proof that “the decision reached would have been different.”280
Stated differently, the court decided not to address prejudice
because Jones’ argument included could instead of would.281
Without the prejudice prong, the outcome may have been
different and Jack Jones may still be alive. However, Jack Jones
was executed on April 24, 2017.282
Lastly, Kenneth Williams’ counsel failed to remove a biased
juror who stated that she “felt very strong about the [death
penalty.]”283 Williams’ counsel did testify that he would have
excused this juror provided he had challenges left.284 The court
decided that this did not carry a reasonable probability that the
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. at 378, 64 S.W.3d at 715.
Id.
Id. at 380, 54 S.W.3d at 716.
Pilkington & Rosenberg, supra note 79.
Jones II, 340 Ark. 1, 5, 8 S.W.3d 482, 484 (2000).
Id. at 10, 8 S.W.3d at 488 (emphasis added).
Id.
See id. (emphasis added).
Pilkington et al., supra note 79.
Williams v. State, 369 Ark. 104, 111, 251 S.W.3d 290, 295 (2007).
Id.
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outcome would have been different.285 It then follows that
without the prejudice prong, the court may have found deficient
performance sufficient for a new trial. However, Kenneth
Williams was executed on April 27, 2017.286 These four executed
inmates may still be alive but for the prejudice prong of the
Strickland standard.
CONCLUSION
Physical presence of counsel is not equivalent to competent
representation. Strickland, although important, has created an
unreachable burden for criminal defendants to meet when
claiming ineffective counsel. Dropping the second prong for
death penalty cases focuses the reviewing court’s attention where
it should be—attorney competence. If any defendant deserves a
more focused appellate standard, it is death penalty defendants.
Once the lethal injection is dispensed, there are no reversals,
relief, or judicial assistance. If any defendants deserve a
heightened standard of representation, it is death penalty
defendants.

285. Id. at 113, 251 S.W.3d at 296.
286. Ed Pilkington and Jacob Rosenberg, Fourth and Final Arkansas Inmate Kenneth
Williams Executed, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 28, 2017), [https://perma.cc/SN6Y-7EVP].
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Appendix A
Arkansas Eight Inmates

Inmate*

Date of County of
Category
Sentence Trial Court

Marcel
Williams287

1/14/97

Pulaski
County

Jack Jones288

4/17/96

White
County

Ledell Lee289
Kenneth D.
Williams290
Don W.
Davis291
Stacey E.
Johnson292
Bruce E.
Ward293
Jason
McGehee294

10/12/95
8/30/00
3/6/92
9/23/94
10/18/90
1/8/97

Pulaski
County
Lincoln
County
Benton
County
Siever
County
Pulaski
County
Boone
County

Failure to
Present
Mitigating
Evidence
Failure to
Present
Mitigating
Evidence
Failure to
Object
Failure to
Prepare
Failure to
Prepare
Failure to
Prepare
Failure to
Object
Failure to
Prepare

Other

Executed

Executed

Executed
Executed

Clemency

*Footnotes attached to inmate’s name indicate the Strickland claim case information.
287. Williams I, 338 Ark. 97, 991 S.W.2d 565, (1999).
288. Jones I, 329 Ark. 62, 947 S.W.2d 339 (1997).
289. Lee v. State, 2009 Ark. 255, 308 S.W.3d 596.
290. Williams v. State, 347 Ark. 728, 67 S.W.3d 548 (2002).
291. Davis v. State, 314 Ark. 257, 863 S.W.2d 259 (1993).
292. Johnson v. State, 326 Ark. 430, 934 S.W.2d 179 (1996).
293. Ward v. Norris, 577 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2009).
294. McGehee v. State, 348 Ark. 395, 72 S.W.3d 867 (2002).

836

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73:4

Appendix B
Current Death Row Inmates in Arkansas

Inmate*

Jack G.
Greene295
Andrew
Sasser296
Jerry D.
Lard297
Randy W.
Gay298
Ray
Dansby299
Zachariah
Marcyniuk300
Timothy W.
Kemp301
Latavious
Johnson302

Date of
Sentence

7/1/99
3/3/94
7/28/12
3/19/15
6/11/93
12/12/08
12/2/94
11/4/14

County of
Trial
Court
Johnson
County
Miller
County
Greene
County
Garland
County
Union
County
Washington
County
Pulaski
County
Lee County

Category

Other

Failure to Object
Failure to Object
Failure to Object
Failure to Object
Failure to Prepare
Failure to Prepare
Failure to Prepare
Failure to Prepare

Attorney
Conduct
Issues303

*Footnotes attached to inmate’s name indicate the Strickland claim case information.
295. Greene v. State, 356 Ark. 59, 146 S.W.3d 871 (2004).
296. Sasser v. State, 338 Ark. 375, 993 S.W.2d 901 (1999).
297. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, State v. Lard, 2014 Ark. 1 (No. CR 2012173).
298. Brief for Appellant, Gay v. State, No. CR-19-762 (Ark. Feb. 07, 2020).
299. Dansby v. State, 350 Ark. 60, 84 S.W.3d 857 (2002).
300. Marcyniuk v. State, 2014 Ark. 268, 436 S.W.3d 122.
301. Kemp v. State, 324 Ark. 178, 919 S.W.2d 943 (1996).
302. Brief for Appellant, Johnson v. State, 2020 Ark. 168 (No. CR 19-847).
303. Johnson v. State, 2015 Ark. 414.
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Inmate*

Date of
Sentence

County of
Trial
Court

Alvin
Jackson304

6/20/96

Jefferson
County

Karl D.
Roberts305

5/24/00

Polk
County

Kenneth
Isom306

12/20/01

Drew
County

Zachary D.
Holly307

5/27/15

Benton
County

Thomas
Springs308

11/24/05

Sebastian
County

Brandon E.
Lacy309

5/13/09

Benton
County

Roderick L.
Rankin310

2/13/96

Jefferson
County

Terrick T.
Nooner311

9/28/93

Pulaski
County

Category

837

Other

Failure to Present
Mitigating
Evidence
Failure to Present
Mitigating
Evidence
Failure to Present
Mitigating
Evidence
Failure to Present
Mitigating
Evidence
Failure to Present
Mitigating
Evidence
Failure to Present
Mitigating
Evidence
Failure to Present
Mitigating
Evidence
Failure to Present
Mitigating
Evidence

304. Jackson v. State, 352 Ark. 359, 105 S.W.3d 352 (2003).
305. Roberts v. State, 2020 Ark. 45, 592 S.W.3d 675.
*Footnotes attached to inmate’s name indicate the Strickland claim case information.
306. Isom v. State, 2010 Ark. 495, 370 S.W.3d 491.
307. Petition for Relief, State v. Holly, No. 04CR-13-1 (Ark. Cir. Ct. May 18, 2018).
308. Springs v. State, 2012 Ark 87, 387 S.W.3d 143.
309. State v. Lacy, 2016 Ark. 38, 480 S.W.3d 856.
310. Rankin v. State, 365 Ark. 255, 227 S.W.3d 924 (2006).
311. Nooner v. State, 339 Ark. 253, 4 S.W.3d 497 (1999).

838

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Inmate*

Date of
Sentence

County of
Trial
Court

Justin
Anderson312

1/31/02

Lafayette
County

Gregory
Decay313

4/24/08

Washington
County

Kenneth
Reams314

12/16/93

Jefferson
County

Mickey D.
Thomas315

9/28/05

Pike
County

5/17/07

Ashley
County

Derek
Sales316
Mauricio A.
Torres318
Brad H.
Smith319
Eric A.
Reid320

11/15/16
7/28/17
3/12/18

Benton
County
Cleveland
County
Garland
County

Vol. 73:4

Category

Other

Failure to Present
Mitigating
Evidence
Failure to Present
Mitigating
Evidence
Failure to Present
Mitigating
Evidence
Failure to Present
Mitigating
Evidence
Failure to Present
Mitigating
Evidence

Off
death
row

Off
death
row

Attorney
Conduct
Issues317

Retrial Granted
Sentenced
Recently
Sentenced
Recently

312. Anderson v. Kelley, 938 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2019).
313. Decay v. State, 2014 Ark. 387, 441 S.W.3d 899.
*Footnotes attached to inmate’s name indicate the Strickland claim case information.
314. Reams v. State, 2018 Ark. 324, 560 S.W.3d 441; Brantley, supra note 209.
315. Thomas v. State, 2014 Ark. 123, 431 S.W.3d 923.
316. Sales v. State, 2013 Ark. 218.
317. Sales v. State, 2010 Ark. 320.
318. Tracy Neal, Judge Sets Retrial Date for Northwest Arkansas Man Accused of
Killing Son, ARK. DEMOCRATIC GAZETTE (Oct. 8, 2019), [https://perma.cc/BU6L-CLJV];
Courthouse Scuffle Leads to Mistrial in Mauricio Torres’ Case, 5 NEWS (Mar. 5, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/868Y-YLF6].
319. Brief for Appellant, Smith v. State, No. CR-20-86 (Ark. Apr. 13, 2020).
320. Reid v. State, No. CR-18-517 (Ark. June 15, 2018).

2021

Inmate*

Scotty R.
Gardner321
Billy
Thessing322
Robert
Holland323

POST-CONVICTION

Date of
Sentence

8/22/18
9/10/04
7/10/14

County of
Trial
Court
Faulkner
County
Pulaski
County
Lincoln
County

Category

839

Other

Sentenced
Recently
Sealed Record
Sentenced
Recently

321. Brief for Appellant, Gardner v. State, 2020 Ark. 147 (No. CR-19-257).
322. Thessing v. State, No. CR-05-420 (Ark. Apr. 13, 2005).
*Footnotes attached to inmate’s name indicate the Strickland claim case information.
323. Holland v. State, 2015 Ark. 318, 468 S.W.3d 782.

